







Campbell, J. (2009) Chance in the tragedies of Racine. In: Lyons, J. and 
Wine, K. (eds.) Chance, Literature, and Culture in Early Modern France. 




Deposited on: 11 February 2010 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
John Campbell, ‘Chance in the Tragedies of Racine’, in Chance, Literature, and 
Culture in Early Modern France, ed. by John Lyons and Kathleen Wine (Burlington, 
VT: Ashgate, 2009), pp. 111-22.  
 
Chance in the tragedies of Racine 
 
Is the outcome of Racine’s tragedies decided by a throw of the dice? Put like this, the 
question invites skepticism, if not derision. Racine? Chance would be a fine thing! 
The reaction is understandable. Of all the great tragedies in world literature that are 
still performed and read, those of Racine are commonly presented as deliberately 
logical structures, pieces of intricate dramatic clockwork in which chance has no 
place. Georges Forestier has argued persuasively that these plays are carefully 
constructed in order to arrive at a preordained conclusion, seen as the starting-point of 
the playwright’s whole creative endeavor.1 Other critics have tried to demonstrate 
how Racine arouses interest and emotion through a carefully worked plot, and without 
any reliance on the gratuitous.2 After all, are chance and coincidence not defining 
characteristics of melodrama?3 And melodrama might seem, on the face of it, at an 
uttermost remove from Racine’s tragedies, with their Aristotelian hinterland, severely 
                                               
1
 See Racine, Théâtre, Poésie, ed. Georges Forestier. Editions de la Pléiade (Paris, 1999), p. xl. 
References to Racine’s plays will be to this edition, with line-references set in parenthesis in the body 
of the text. The following published translations of Racine’s plays are used: Jean Racine, Andromache, 
Britannicus, Berenice, trans. John Cairncross (London, 1967), and Racine, Phaedra, trans. Robert 
Lowell (London, 1961). I also use Aristotle, The Art of Poetry, trans. Ingram Bywater (Oxford, 1967), 
with chapter references in parenthesis in the body of the text. 
2
 As for example John Campbell, Questioning Racinian Tragedy (Chapel Hill, 2005), in particular pp. 
37-84. 
3
 See Hélène Baby, La Tragi-Comédie de Corneille à Quinault (Paris, 2001), for whom the tragicomic 
plot is typically resolved through chance, coincidences and unexpected encounters (p. 169). 
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restricted form, and cause-and-effect structure. For many, in addition, the idea that 
chance is not soluble in the mixture called “Racinian tragedy” will be reinforced by a 
traditional view that in this particular tragic universe the outcome is determined by a 
relentless fatality, an inexorable force that lies beyond the will of individuals and is 
untroubled by the unpredictable contingencies of the everyday. All in all, there 
appears to be little or any breathing space for Dame Fortune. 
 This article will nonetheless attempt to argue that, while events do not happen 
gratuitously, chance, or rather the appearance of chance, does have a significant role 
to play in these works. It will also suggest that Racine’s tragic dramas would not 
succeed either as dramas or tragedies unless the spectator implicitly accepted that the 
outcome was open to contingency.  
To this end, however, it is worth giving some time to that initial, natural 
reaction of disbelief that chance and Racine’s tragedies are natural bedfellows. This 
skepticism is supported by an overwhelming weight of opinion, from unimpeachable 
sources. An example is Marmontel’s formulation that “tragedy depicts the interplay of 
the passions, not of chance events.”4 This uncontroversial opinion reflects Aristotle’s 
insistence on the need for universals in tragedy:  
 
Poetry is something more philosophic and of graver import than history, since 
its statements are of the nature rather of universals, whereas those of history are 
singulars. By a universal statement I mean one as to what such or such a kind of 
man will probably or necessarily say or do. (ch. 9)  
 
                                               
4
 Marmontel, Poétique française, 2 vols (Paris, 1763), II, 217 (my translation). 
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This requirement for universals leads Aristotle to suggest that the dramatic action 
should be “one continuous whole” (ch. 10). Unity of Action would be threatened by 
recourse to the arbitrary, since in any series of events it is causal sequence that 
provides a sense of unity. This is why the Reversal and Discovery that Aristotle puts 
at the heart of the tragic action “should arise out of the structure of the Plot itself, so 
as to be the consequence, necessary or probable, of the antecedents” (ch. 10). The 
cause-and-effect structure of the plot is embedded in this “necessary or probable.” 
Logically enough, therefore, for Aristotle what he calls “the worst” type of plot is 
“when there is neither probability nor necessity in the sequence of episodes” (ch. 9).  
This perspective seems by definition to exclude chance from the domain of 
tragedy, the more so since, as Malcolm Heath points out, “chance is defined by 
Aristotle in Physics 2.5 by contrast with what happens always or for the most part, 
that is, by contrast with the necessary or probable.”5 Given all the authority afforded 
the Aristotelian text in seventeenth-century France, it is understandable that a tragic 
dramatist such as Racine would not stoop to using the merely random or arbitrary in 
the resolution of his tragic action. It was in the context of Aristotle’s reasoned 
disapproval that in 1647 Vossius formally excluded chance from the domain of 
tragedy, while Corneille himself quoted Aristotle’s distinction (ch. 10) between 
propter hoc and post hoc, between an event that causes another and one than merely 
precedes another: the second of these has no place in tragedy.6  
The challenge for the tragic dramatist was therefore to create an apparently 
insoluble dilemma and then to resolve it without any recourse to chance. A clear 
                                               
5
 Malcolm Heath, ‘The Universality of Poetry in Aristotle’s Poetics’, Classical Quarterly, 41 (1991), 
389-402 (p. 391). 
6
 Corneille, Writings on the Theatre, ed. H.T. Barnwell (Oxford, 1965), p. 64. More generally on this 
point, see Jacques Scherer, La dramaturgie classique en France, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1950), p. 100. 
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example is the treatment of the denouement, which in Aristotle’s words “should arise 
out of the plot itself, and not depend on a stage-artifice” (ch. 14), implying 
disapproval for any form of deus ex machina. With his habitual polemical verve, 
Racine rejected the idea that he had used such a device in Iphigénie, with the 
invention of the victim substituted at the last minute for the daughter of Agamemnon. 
His response to his critics shows an extreme sensitivity to any suggestion that he 
could stray from the straight and narrow of the probable or necessary, as indeed he 
implies Euripides had done with the story of the metamorphosis of the sacrificial 
victim into a deer: 
 
And how plausible would it seem if the plot of my tragedy were resolved with 
the help of a goddess and a machine, and by a metamorphosis that some may 
well have found credible in Euripides’ day, but which for us would be too 
absurd and incredible?7 
 
Is chance then banished from Racine’s tragedies? It seems to be an open and 
shut case. This article will maintain, on the contrary, that chance, even in the sense of 
fortune, does have some place in these works. In addition, and more significantly, 
without questioning the cause-and-effect structure of Racine’s plays, it will attempt to 
show that it is possible to place the role of chance in another perspective, on condition 
that we accept the premise that a play is first and foremost a dramatic illusion to 
which the spectator willingly submits. 
                                               
7
 Preface to Iphigénie (my translation). 
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First, chance is commonly defined as “the unknown and unpredictable element 
that causes an event to result in a certain way rather than in another” (Collins English 
Dictionary). That serves as a reminder that fortune does intervene in Racine’s 
tragedies. In four of his plays, La Thébaïde, Alexandre le Grand, Bajazet, and 
Mithridate, the course of events does appear to turn on what might be called the 
fortune of war. Battles being what they are, different outcomes must be possible for 
the characters involved. For example, in Alexandre le Grand, it is Fortune (1293) that 
is held responsible when Porus escapes, as it could be again when he confronts Taxile 
(1503). Interestingly, in La Thébaïde Etéocle speaks directly of the hazards of war 
(66), a reference Racine removed in later editions, as though conscious of the enmity 
between any suggestion of chance and a noble idea of tragedy. The structure of 
Bajazet, however, was not changed: here the fate of the characters, and especially of 
the eponymous hero, secretly condemned to death by the sultan Amurat, depends on 
the outcome of a distant battle. The wheel of fortune turns, and the sultan wins: 
“Amurat est heureux, la fortune est changée” (1169) [“Amurat is content, Fortune has 
changed”]. It is at this point that that news comes of the sudden arrival of an emissary, 
bearing the sultan’s murderous message. If this event astonishes Roxane (1102), the 
sultan’s favorite concubine who is in love with Bajazet, it also must surprise the 
audience, in the absence of any prior allusion to the possibility of such an unexpected 
intervention.  
It is in Bajazet, indeed, that we find the most egregious intervention of pure 
chance, since Roxane’s certainty of being betrayed by Bajazet comes from a letter 
found on his beloved’s person after her she has fainted (1260).8 Equally, in Iphigénie, 
                                               
8
 On the part played by chance in Bajazet, see Campbell, pp. 102-6. 
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the revelation of the identity of Eriphile, permitting Iphigénie to get off the sacrificial 
hook, is not just a coup de théâtre but, at least to some extent, a deus ex machina, 
since it is not clear how this information was uncovered.9 One might also ask, in 
Mithridate, by what mishap Monime’s diadem broke, instead of strangling her as she 
intended (1504-8), and why a messenger arrived just in time to prevent her taking the 
poison Mithridate had provided for that purpose (1540-44). Melodrama? Faced with 
moments such as these, in another century, and in another genre, one word might just 
flit cheekily through the mind: Hollywood. 
These few cases might be considered with some justice as exceptions that 
prove the general rule that chance has no part to play in Racine’s tragedies. There is 
however, one important element that, by definition, does not issue from a probable or 
necessary sequence: the exposition. In Aristotles’s words, “a beginning is that which 
is not itself necessarily after anything else” (ch. 7). A classic example from Sophocles 
is the chance meeting of Oedipus at the crossroads with the person whom he will later 
discover to have been his father. In other words, the initial situation of a tragedy, on 
which the whole play is built, may originate in chance, that is, in something neither 
probable nor necessary.10 Different pressures, passions, and forces have been in 
existence for some time: only a fortuitous event, or set of circumstances, allows the 
tragic situation to develop. For example, in Phèdre, it is because her husband has 
decided to go to Trézène that the heroine is brought into close contact with her 
stepson Hippolyte, whom she has had banished there as she attempts to forget having 
fallen violently in love with him (297-303). Both of these crucial events, on which the 
whole tragic action is based, may be ascribed to fortune, unless, that is, one accepts 
                                               
9
 A point made by Scherer, Dramaturgie classique, p. 130. 
10
 On this, see Heath, pp. 394-5. 
Chance in Racine’s Tragedies  7 
the thesis that characters are mere puppets in the hands of cruel Gods. One might also 
ask what “probable or necessary” basis there is, in Iphigénie, for the “hidden voice” 
(516) that strangely persuades Eriphile to go to the one place in which her life will be 
at risk. In that same play, there is one crucial intervention of chance that leads 
Iphigénie to come back to the mortal trap awaiting her, and so springs the whole 
tragic dilemma. For if she fails to encounter the messenger that Agamemnon has sent 
to prevent her from returning, using the lie that Achille has changed his mind about 
marrying her, this is quite simply because she and her mother lose their way and take 
the wrong road home (631). In addition, the final five scenes in Act II hinge on the 
misunderstandings occasioned by this supposed change of mind by Achille, leading 
Jacques Scherer to recall that such situations are common features of the nineteenth-
century French farce.11  
The role played by chance in establishing the initial situation is nowhere better 
illustrated than in the exposition of Andromaque. In the first scene Oreste describes 
how he went to Greece looking for military glory, in order to forget Hermione, and 
quite by chance arrived just when the Greek princes had assembled to deal with 
Pyrrhus’s refusal of her. His fateful embassy therefore comes from his having been in 
the right (or as it turns out wrong) place at the right time (58-66). A second piece of 
luck is celebrated in the opening lines:  
 
Oui, puisque je retrouve un Ami si fidèle, 
Ma Fortune va prendre une face nouvelle; 
Et déjà son courroux semble s'être adouci, 
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 Scherer, Dramaturgie classique, p. 75. 
Chance in Racine’s Tragedies  8 
Depuis qu'elle a pris soin de nous rejoindre ici. (1-4) 
[Yes, since I find again so true a friend, / Fortune’s about to take a different 
turn; / Her anger seems already to abate / Since she took pains to reunite us 
here.] 
 
The reunion of the two friends is thus as fortuitous as their previous separation 
through the lottery of a storm. There is no explanation as to why they should have 
spent six months sailing about the coast, and none as to why they should meet up at 
such an important time. In other words, the initial situation, from which the whole 
dramatic action flows, owes much to fortune.  
In this context, it seems equally difficult to place the coup de foudre, such as 
that experienced by Phèdre, in any category of the probable or necessary. It is true that 
Aristotle is at hand with a dispensation: “There should be nothing improbable among 
the actual incidents. If it be unavoidable, however, it should be outside the tragedy” 
(ch. 15). “Outside the tragedy”? Here the case of Britannicus is instructive. It is only 
in Act II, Scene 2 that we as an audience learn that Néron has fallen in love with 
Junie. This is a moment of revelation for which not only the spectator is unprepared. 
 
Néron:   Narcisse c’en est fait. Néron est amoureux. 
   [Narcissus, all is lost, I’ve fallen in love.] 
Narcisse: Vous? 
   [You?] 
Néron:   Depuis un moment, mais pour toute ma vie, 
   J’aime (que dis-je aimer) j’idolâtre Junie. 
   [Only now, but it’s for all my life. / I love, nay, I adore, I 
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 worship Junie.] 
Narcisse: Vous l’aimez?  
[You love her?] (382-5) 
 
Without being physically present until Act II, Néron has been at the very centre of the 
dramatic action from the beginning. However, this has been as son and half-brother, 
as emperor and usurper, certainly not as a lover. Narcisse’s reaction demonstrates the 
extent to which his master’s new role is a bolt from the blue. What then of the idea 
that a cause-and-effect structure should be constituted from the elements presented in 
the exposition? In Corneille’s words, “I would like the first act to contain the basis of 
the whole dramatic action, and for it to close the door on anything else being 
introduced later in the play.”12 Although one can perfectly well argue that Néron’s 
coup de foudre happened before the beginning of the tragic action, it is the sudden 
revelation of this chance event that is important. Britannicus is, after all, a play 
created to hold an audience. And we as an audience experience’s Néron’s love as 
something entirely new, and almost gratuitous, something that nothing previous could 
have led us to expect. Any link with the “probable or necessary” seems tenuous. 
 A play? An audience? It is here that we reach the heart of any attempt to 
grapple with the notion of chance in Racine’s tragedies. On the one hand, as we have 
seen, both playwrights and pundits freely admitted the need for a cause-and-effect 
structure: the effect of the tragic action would be less powerful, and indeed not tragic, 
if the play’s outcome depended on a series of events without previous cause. On the 
other hand, that is not how the spectator sees things, or even wishes to see them. As 
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 Corneille, ‘Discours de l’utilité et des parties du poème dramatique’, in Writings, p. 22 (my 
translation). 
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Jacques Scherer pointed out, when dramatists decided not to resort to chance, they 
were in conflict with what audiences wanted.13 A tragic action that follows a 
predictable path to a known outcome will not engage those watching, whether at the 
theatre or with the mind’s eye. Such involvement demands the unpredictable: it feeds 
on suspense and surprise. From this we may deduce that what concerned Racine, as a 
practical dramatist, more than any slavish adherence to supposed norms, was the 
desire to move and to hold his audience. That alone is “necessary,” as Corneille quite 
robustly had pointed out: “I therefore maintain that in tragedy what is “necessary” is 
nothing other than the dramatist’s need to reach the destination he has decided on or 
make sure his characters reach it.”14 
It is in this light, for example, that an audience will accept that in the fourth 
scene of Andromaque the heroine should come on stage at a critical moment without 
any particular reason for doing so: she is just passing through on her way to see her 
son.15 A similar example comes from Athalie. One might ask what “instinct” (527) 
made the queen go into the temple the first time and thus, quite by chance, see the boy 
Joas, an act on which the whole plot hinges. Whatever the apparent role of fortune, 
however, both these encounters are dramatically necessary, in order to engineer a 
confrontation that both expresses and intensifies the conflict on which the plots of 
these two plays are based. For in the end, as Corneille suggests, for the playwright the 
play comes first. Equally, in Mithridate and Phèdre, the sudden and spectacular 
reappearance of an apparently dead king, by coincidence just after compromising 
                                               
13
 Scherer, Dramaturgie classique, p. 100. 
14
 Corneille, ‘Discours de la Tragédie et des moyens de la traiter selon le vraisemblable et le 
nécessaire’, Writings, p. 59 (my translation). 
15
 As Georges Forestier observes (edition of the plays, p. 1352, note to l. 260), such apparently 
gratuitous stage appearances were frowned on by pundits and purists. 
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declarations of love made only because news of the death was too readily believed, 
clearly illustrates this primacy of the dramatic. A measure of the seeming 
improbability of that survival and return, at the time it happens, is the reaction of 
characters who declaim against “Cruel Fortune” on hearing the news (Mithridate, 
335-6). If “chance” is one name we give to that freedom of the unpredictable, and to 
the seemingly improbable, then it clearly has its place in Racine’s tragedies. 
The playwright is thus faced with conflicting demands. On the one hand, even 
the most surprising event should seem a probable or necessary consequence of what 
precedes it, as D’Aubignac, was quick to point out: “although the spectator wishes to 
be surprised, he wants the event to appear plausible.”16 On the other hand, as that 
High Priest of verisimilitude was well aware, it is a basic dramatic principle that the 
audience should not be too prepared for what is about to happen: “All these 
preparations are defects in a play, because when the events in question come about 
they lack interest and have little effect on the audience.”17 Aristotle had already noted 
this apparent paradox:  
 
Tragedy, however, is an imitation not only of a complete action, but also of 
incidents arousing pity and fear. Such incidents have the very greatest effect on 
the mind when they occur unexpectedly and at the same time in consequence of 
one another. (ch. 9)  
 




 D’Aubignac, La Pratique du Théâtre, ed. Hélène Baby (Paris, 2001), pp. 200 and 193 (my 
translation).. 
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It is this necessary coexistence of causality with unpredictability that opens the 
door to the apparent place of chance in Racine’s tragedies. This reminds us that the 
word “chance” is itself Janus-like, looking back or forward. Used with a retrospective 
gaze, it is “the occurrence and development of events in the absence of any obvious 
design or cause”, whereas when there is an attempt to anticipate, the term indicates “a 
possibility of something happening” (OED). This distinction between reflection and 
expectation mirrors the two different roles the audience is required to play, as John 
Lyons has noted:  
 
During the tragedy, the audience is expected to behave as if what happens 
onstage were really happening. […] On the other hand the spectator is also 
supposed to reflect critically on the dramatic presentation and on the text in 
order to judge it as a work of art. […] In the moment of the dramatic 
performance (or while reading a play), the audience of a successful tragedy 
believes in the truth of the events and characters. Only after this experience, and 
most of all, after repeated experiences of this sort, can the spectator transform 
the perception of the véritable into a judgment of vraisemblance.18  
 
This verisimilitude thus demands that on reflection, after the event, a plausible 
reason must be found for what at the time seems to depend on fortune. For example, 
in Phèdre, we as an audience, at the moment when the scene is being painted for us, 
might see Hippolyte’s inability to control his frightened horses as a matter of bad luck 
(1535-43). It is only afterwards, on reflection, that we might recall how he had 
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 John Lyons, Kingdom of Disorder. The Theory of Tragedy in Classical France (West Lafayette, 
1999), pp. 93-4. 
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neglected his horsemanship to pursue his forbidden love for Aricie (129-32). Chance, 
therefore, may give the appearance of being present before and during the event. 
Events seem to strike like lightning, in an unpredictable and seemingly fortuitous 
way. There is an unforeseen change of fortune, an event contrary to rational 
expectation. The creation of suspense and surprise is therefore entirely consistent with 
the probable or necessary. Fortune only disappears as part of the equation after the 
event: as an audience we realize that what happened had to happen, we fit it into a 
coherent sequence of events. Before it happens, however, different possibilities are 
held open. It is, therefore, through the crafting of this illusion of contingency and 
volatility, rather than by any slavish adherence to hidebound neo-Aristotelian 
conventions, that Racine was able to create works of art so charged with emotion, 
beauty, and truth. As D’Aubignac suggested, the different elements of a tragedy 
should interact so well that they seem to arise spontaneously, and progress towards a 
resolution through their own impetus, with their creator as though standing watching 
in the wings.19  
The dramatic experience provided by this illusion is linked with two common 
features of seventeenth-century French tragedy in general, and of Racine’s tragedies 
in particular. The first is the freedom given to characters. To illustrate the point, 
Jacques Scherer chooses the tragedy traditionally viewed, with Athalie, as the most 
determinist of them all, Phèdre: “At every moment in that fateful day, Phèdre was 
free to spurn Œnone’s advice; indeed, that day is tragic only because Phèdre chose to 
proceed in a way she was very quickly going to condemn.”20 Destiny, in other words, 
                                               
19
 Quoted by Georges Forestier, Passions tragiques et règles classiques. Essai sur la tragédie française 
(Paris, 2003), p. 102. 
20
 Jacques Scherer, Racine et/ou la cérémonie (Paris, 1982), pp. 34-5 (my translation). 
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is not some inflexible fate dished out to puppet-like characters: it is, more simply, 
what happens to them.21 And what will happen is impossible to predict.  
A second important link with our experience as an audience is the idea of 
reversal. Emotion is created when what happens is the very opposite of what 
characters intended, or of what would have seemed plausible beforehand. Aristotle 
gives a famous illustration:  
 
Even matters of chance seem most marvelous if there is an appearance of design 
as it were in them; as for instance the statue of Mitys at Argos killed the author 
of Mitys' death by falling down on him when a looker-on at a public spectacle; 
for incidents like that we think to be not without a meaning. A Plot, therefore, of 
this sort is necessarily finer than others. (ch. 9) 
 
This story is used by Aristotle to illustrate his paradoxical observation, noted earlier, 
that events have the most impact on spectators when they occur “unexpectedly and at 
the same time in consequence of one another”. The “appearance of design” is thus 
consubstantial with the appearance of chance. Both work together to generate emotion 
and tragic irony. In retrospect the appearance of chance may be dismissed, as a mere 
appearance. But man does not live in retrospect alone, especially not at the theatre. An 
audiences lives a performance in the present: that is one good reason for calling it 
“live.”  
It is thus in the spectator’s living experience of the dramatic action, if only in 
that golden dramatic moment before the event, that the tragic action seems to move 
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 Note Forestier, Passions, p. 317, on the non-fatalistic meaning of the terms destin and fatal in 
Racine’s tragedies. 
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freely, beyond the iron grip of the probable and necessary. Here, at the moment of 
impact, fortune seems to intervene: the king gone missing will return unexpectedly, 
and at the worst moment, when his wife and son, thinking him dead, have just come 
clean about their forbidden loves. This is not a question of “stuff happens”, or even 
what Aristotle calls “the probability of even improbabilities coming to pass” (ch. 18). 
Tragedy is not “life”, but a carefully constructed artifice designed to arouse emotion. 
And it is precisely for this reason that high tragic drama can use the techniques of the 
melodrama. Events can happen in a manner that seems fortuitous, at a time when 
characters, and audiences, least expect them. In this context emerge concepts such as 
the coup de théâtre and “peripety,” the sudden and unexpected event that reverses the 
expectations of characters and audience. An example given by Jacques Scherer is the 
succession of surprises that structure Act V of Mithridate, as for example the report 
that Xipharès is dead beyond any doubt, (1478), a report that is absolutely believed, 
and is absolutely false.22  
The surprise caused by overturning of expectations based on what is probable 
can give a sense that fortune has intervened. This sense that something has happened 
by chance may be momentary, and be quickly replaced by our realization, as 
characters or audience, that we should or could have realized that what happened had 
to happen. But that moment simply cannot be dismissed, since much of the emotional 
charge of tragic drama is contained within it. In this perspective, a telling example 
occurs in the continuation of those opening lines of Andromaque quoted earlier: 
 
Qui l'eût dit, qu'un rivage à mes vœux si funeste, 
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 Scherer, Dramaturgie classique, p. 86. 
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Présenterait d'abord Pylade aux yeux d'Oreste, 
Qu'après plus de six mois que je t'avais perdu, 
A la Cour de Pyrrhus tu me serais rendu!  
[“Who would have thought on this unlikely shore / Orestes would at once meet 
Pylades; / And, when you had been lost for six long months, / At Pyrrhus’ court 
you’d be restored to me.”] (5-8) 
What these words emphasize, especially through the framing device of the “Qui l'eût 
dit…?,” is the unanticipated nature of the event. From the beginning, in other words, 
the audience is attuned to a dramatic action in which the unexpected may be expected 
to happen. Pylade suggests that his friend’s luck has turned: “Un Destin plus heureux 
vous conduit en Epire” [“A happier fate to Epirus guides your steps.”] (22), and 
Oreste’s reply underlines this unpredictability: “qui peut savoir le Destin qui 
m’amène?” [“who can fortell my Destiny?”] (25). These lines serve to illustrate the 
simple fact that dramatic tension is created by the necessarily partial knowledge of the 
characters on stage. They do not know the true situation, in its totality, nor what 
impact their actions will have. This vulnerability to the unpredictable, which is always 
to some degree shared by the audience, is revealed in those moments of surprise 
when, if only for a moment, it seems that chance has intervened to disturb the 
predicted course of events. The decisions taken by characters have therefore 
something in them of a throw of the dice, a reminder of what the word chance meant 
in Racine’s time.  
In that same opening scene of Andromaque, when Oreste asks Pylade what 
Pyrrhus will do, his friend’s answer seems to account for the most improbable of 
possibilities, since it seems obvious that everything will turn on the king’s eventual 
decision: 
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Il peut, Seigneur, il peut, dans ce désordre extrême, 
Épouser ce qu'il hait et perdre ce qu'il aime.  
[“He may, sir, in this frenzied turmoil wed / The one he hates and spurn the one  
he loves.”] (121-2) 
 
What really happens is, as we will find out, even more unexpected. The same is true 
of the different possible courses of action projected by Oreste, depending on whether 
Hermione can or cannot be persuaded to come away with him:  
 
J'aime; je viens chercher Hermione en ces lieux, 
La fléchir, l'enlever, ou mourir à ses yeux.  
[“I love, and come to win Hermione, / Carry her off or die before her eyes.”] 
(99-100)  
 
Do or die: it is a rational attempt to construct a probable or necessary scenario, before 
the event. Nothing of the sort of course happens. The outcome depends on such a 
complicated chain of interconnecting events as to defeat attempts at rational 
prediction. After all, at the outset of Andromaque it would seem highly improbable 
that Oreste, sent as ambassador by the Greeks, could kill a reigning monarch, and 
great Greek hero of the Trojan War, to satisfy the desire for revenge of a woman who, 
openly, loves that person rather than him. When a desperate Hermione comes to 
propose that course of action, Oreste’s reaction is thus one of incredulity (1176-7). 
How could he have imagined that he would accept such a contract, or indeed that she 
would refuse to honour it when the deed was done? What could possibly seem 
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“probable or necessary” here, before the event? After the event it becomes easy to see 
that Hermione’s word should not have been believed, a cold truth that ironically 
issues from her jealous fury: “Ah! Fallait-il en croire une Amante insensée?” [“Ah! 
How could you believe my frantic words?”] (1585) But at the moment of its delivery, 
her rejection of Oreste is as much a surprise for the audience as for the character. At 
this point of maximum emotional impact, the “probable or necessary” has little 
visibility, however illusory that impression will appear with hindsight. This 
experience is true to the extent that even those who know the play by heart, as 
spectators or readers, can suppress that knowledge in order to live in the present of the 
dramatic performance, a term illuminated by its French translation, représentation. 
Within the constraints of the tragic action and the tragic genre itself, we as an 
audience willingly surrender to the sense that “anything might happen,” while being 
ready to dismiss, after the event, anything that is merely gratuitous. 
It is in the creative tension between the unpredictable and the probable or 
necessary that Racine’s tragedies are composed. If he chose to construct a plausible 
and coherent sequence of cause and effect, it was not because he was browbeaten by 
the Academy or hamstrung by rules, but because such plots generate a tragic action of 
deep emotion and lasting pleasure. At the same time, he knew the first rule of all, that 
the lived experience of the theatre is emotional and anticipatory. This means that 
spectators as well as characters are kept in suspense, and are continually surprised, as 
by lightning in a clear sky. “Quel coup me l’a ravi? Quelle foudre soudaine?” [“What 
sudden thunderbolt has struck him down?”] cries out Thésée, in Phèdre (1497), on 
hearing the news that his son is dead. In the cold light of day, which is not that of the 
present, Hippolyte’s fate cannnot be such a surprise. It is indeed because Thésée, in 
blind passion, calls for Hippolyte to be punished that the killing produces such an 
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effect of reversal and recognition, since he realizes that it is he who has caused the life 
of his beloved son to be extinguished. That clear relationship of cause to effect, 
however, does not prevent Racine making the manner in which the event is presented 
appear unexpected and shocking, as the monster surges from a calm sea. Indeed, he 
crafts the timing of its revelation for maximum unsettling impact, by chance just when 
Thésée has discovered that his son is innocent. This plotting technique makes his 
tragedies, at least in appearance, seem much freer, more open, and more uncertain 
than is sometimes assumed.  
And that appearance is of primary importance. For what is theatre but the 
triumph of an appearance, a dramatic illusion? That very fact has been enough for 
moralists from Saint Augustine onwards to reach for their bag of anathemas. In the 
end, therefore, when all the pundits have spoken of the probable and necessary, the 
only inflexible rule for dramatists such as Racine, as he himself made clear, was to 
create a play that moves and holds an audience: “The main rule is to give pleasure and 
arouse emotion. All the others are only designed to reach this first goal.”23 
It is in that truly theatrical context that chance has its chance. 
                                               
23
 Preface to Bérénice (my translation). 
